

**00935**

**1962/10/31**

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK

INFO: Amembassy, Moscow-1034

SUBJECT: CUBA: New York Negotiations

## 1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problem created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. [In spite of Kuznetsov's eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions (USUN's 1547) the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date.]

Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below.

We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine, Kuznetsov's insistence on no physical inspection of dismantling and removal of Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall have to rely on aerial surveillance and post-removal inspection to satisfy ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba.

Drafted by:

IO:ECleveland:mtb/nab/wfh/rp

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Harlan Cleveland

Checked by: ONC/Naughton

10/31/62

Approved by President at the White House  
Executive Comm. Mtg.

10/31/62

S/S - Mr. Little

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FORM 5-61 DS-322

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FOIA Exemptions \_\_\_\_\_ ( ) S or ( ) C OADR  
PA Exemptions \_\_\_\_\_ ( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR

Classification

or destroyed.

While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground together with high and low aerial surveillance during both dismantling period and the post-evacuation period should, if carried out, provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted.

## 2. DEFINITION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 1962. The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Notice (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition on surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellant and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed to be operated at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment, in addition to Komar class motor torpedo boats.

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Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.

Not included in formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26 that "the necessity for the presence of Soviet military specialists in Cuba would disappear" along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

3. TWO-PHASE PROGRAM

The US envisages two phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures.

(a) First Phase - This phase should begin immediately and would

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would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetsov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the <sup>first</sup> ~~first~~ stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments.

(b) Second Phase - This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the ~~next~~ Soviet report on compliance and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection. This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

4. Aerial

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Page 5 of telegram to: USUN - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ NEW YORK

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#### 4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential.

This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done ~~WAI~~ either by the US or by the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

We recognize that (unlike US) UN will wish to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance.

Two

~~WAI~~ types of air surveillance should be considered -- photographic (high and low) and visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport ~~XXXXXX~~ movements.

The Canadian Government has offered to have Canadian ~~XXXXXX~~ pilot fly ~~WAI~~ Canadian supplied RF-101 aircraft. USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept. B1 A5

Alternatively we could make available C-130s and within two-week period train air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent crews which would take only brief period to

check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN

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On request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile. The UN has been informed that USG prepared provide rapid (jet) transportation for ~~UN~~ <sup>C-130</sup> crews politically acceptable to the UN from anywhere in the world.

Another highly attractive possibility would be for Mexico or Argentina to volunteer squadron of T-11s (C-45s) and crews which DOD believes would be fully capable to do kind of job we want. They have adequate high-quality camera equipment. Mexico has six aircraft and Argentina has comparable number. Also Sweden has made available for Congo operation two reconnaissance PT-9s (single-jet aircraft). It is understood that they have a number such aircraft fully equipped with photographic equipment provided

Processing unit with US equipment could be readily ~~EEEE~~ to operate in Havana or at whatever place UN would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging him develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support of UN surveillance, however, should not (repeat not) be tied to US cessation of surveillance. Statements that QTE the US will reconsider its surveillance requirements based upon the effectiveness of UN operations UNQTE can be made, but we should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.

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It should go without saying that to the extent no ~~adequate~~ substitute has been developed by the UN, the US high and low surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy us that offensive weapons have been fully removed from Cuba.

5. INCOMING

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5. INCOMING CARGOES

As indicated DEPTTEL 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspection incoming cargoes on all ships, of whatever flag, embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, \_\_\_\_\_ ships now in transit or scheduled depart bloc ports shortly to arrive in Cuba during next three or four weeks. Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will depend on whether inspection at sea or on shore. Most efficient use manpower would be port inspection at agreed ports. This would permit close inspection of vessels, one after another, without transit time required to shuttle between vessels at sea. Accordingly, hope port inspection agreeable to Cubans. If inspection done at ports, we estimate \_\_\_\_\_ personnel needed. If done on high seas, estimate \_\_\_\_\_ would be required. [Estimates to be supplied.]

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes aboard to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed ~~when~~ (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons

withdrawn

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withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action.

6. VERIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

When Soviets prepared to say they have removed from Cuba the "weapons US considers offensive", a Security Council meeting would be called to authorize the Acting Secretary General to establish arrangements for verification. Executive organization operating in Cuba for this purpose is here referred to as UN/Cuba.

(a) Terms of Reference: UN/Cuba.

UN teams should inspect on spot, after dismantling, those sites which identified by US as missile bases as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers, and any other area where we have reason to believe there may have been concealment of offensive weapons, including storage sites for nuclear warheads. Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties.

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END

US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered.

(b) Number of Observers in the light of the above

The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams, maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50 or 60 men with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover, many UN aerial observers should participate in verification process.

(c) Composition of observers should be made up of

While we assume that probably only citizens of certain types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources of UN ground observers, it is important from our standpoint that eligibility be restricted to technically trained personnel of genuinely reliable nations who have demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crises. For example, we would wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of distinctly UN-UNneutral statements made by their Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden,

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Switzerland,

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Switzerland, Austria, Nigeria, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

7. ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

(a) We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group, port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate under executive direction of SYG. To the extent the International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it should (as indicated DEPTTEL 1136) operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted also as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.

(b) We believe financing all verification measures should come under X \$2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the light of the then U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations.

RUSK

END

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**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

October 31, 1962

ATTENTION: USDB - New York

~~SUBJECT: CUBA; New York Negotiations~~

## 1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

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While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post-evacuation period should, if efficiently carried out, provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted.

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The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber air-  
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for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment  
to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority  
granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special  
Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition  
of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile  
propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to  
power missiles.

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-  
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at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to  
operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of  
communications, supply and missile-launching equipment [including  
Komar class motor torpedo boats].

Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement  
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Revised page

[Soviet] military specialists in Cuba would disappear" along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, [Komar class motor torpedo boats] and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

3. TWO-PHASE PROGRAM.

The US envisages two phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures:

(a) First Phase - This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetsov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments.

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Revised  
page 5

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OK The Canadian government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly ~~USG~~ <sup>Canadian</sup> supplied RF-101 aircraft. [USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept.] Alternatively we could make available C-130s and within two-week period train air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent crews which would take only brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing

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Revised page 9

- 9 -

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Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Nigeria, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

7. ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

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**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

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L. Ball

**ACTION: USIN, New York**

SUBJECT: CUBA: New York Negotiations

## 1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

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[REDACTED]

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Delegates

[REDACTED]



Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, ~~Nigeria~~, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

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~~SECRET~~

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

2115  
(202) R E

October 31, 1962  
5:00 P.M.

ACTION USUN, New York

SUBJECT: CUBA: New York Negotiations

Checked with Sprague 11/2/62  
12 20  
Sent to USUN 11/2/62

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problem created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. In spite of Kuznetsov's eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions (USUN's 1547) the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date.

Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine, Kuznetsov's insistence on physical inspection of dismantling and removal Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall have to rely on aerial surveillance and post removal inspection to satisfy

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ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba or destroyed.

While you should strive for as much pre removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post evacuation period should be efficiently carried out.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FOIA Exemptions  
( ) RELEASE ( ) EXCISE ( ) DENY ( ) DELETE Non-Response into  
CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR  
Date: 4/3/92

## 2. DEFINITION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are those enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23. The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed for use at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment, including Komar class motor torpedo boats.

Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.

Not included in formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26 that "the necessity for the presence of Soviet military specialists in Cuba would disappear" along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

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3. INITIAL TROUBLESHOOTING PROGRAM.

The US envisages multiple phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures:

(a) First Phase - This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetsov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments.

(b) Second Phase - This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection. This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the SIO that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

Arrangements for the third and final phase relating to commitment of the Soviets not to reintroduce offensive weapons will be covered in subsequent instructions.

4. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE.

Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential. This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done either by the US or by the UN. One possibility might be aircraft manned by nationals, presumably impartial, designated by UN. Another possibility might be reconnaissance using crews consisting of representatives of the US, Soviet Union, Cuba, and the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

We recognize that (unlike US) UN would be prepared to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance.

Two types of air surveillance should be considered -- photographic (high and low) and, in phase 1, visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport movements.

The Canadian government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly Canadian supplied RF-101 aircraft. [USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept not only because SYG will probably not regard Canadians as sufficiently neutral but also because RF-101 is a military aircraft. Alternatively we could make available C-130.

and within two to six week period could check out already trained multi-engine air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent C-130 crews which would take only/brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile. Australia may therefore also have some capability. The USG is prepared to provide rapid (jet) transportation for C-130 crews politically acceptable to the UN from anywhere in the world.

~~personnel~~  
~~Training program needed and required by following:~~

A reasonable satisfactory substitute would be the F-27 which could be modified to provide the necessary high and low photographic capability. Crews experienced with F-27s might be obtained from a number of countries, including Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Modification to incorporate the necessary photographic equipment could be completed in ten days after a decision to employ them.

Processing unit with US equipment could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place UN would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to BYG, strongly urging him to develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support of UN surveillance, however, should not ~~be~~ be tied to US cessation of surveillance. Statements that QFE The United States will reconsider its surveillance requirements

based upon the effectiveness of UN operations UNQTE can be made, but we should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.

It should go without saying that to the extent no adequate substitute has been developed by the UN, the US high and low surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy us that offensive weapons have been fully removed from Cuba.

5. INCOMING CARGOES.

~~Entire paragraph omitted and replaced by the following~~

As indicated Deptel 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspections incoming <sup>flag</sup> cargoes on all ships of whatever/embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, the USSR will need to schedule a total of about 100 ships shortly to arrive in Cuba during the next 3-4 weeks in order to accomplish removal of dismantled equipment. (In addition to 60 ships normally used for offensive equipment, USSR would have to adapt about 40 others for purpose). Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will be about equal whether inspection on sea or shore. At sea less inspectors required per ship because cargo holds cannot be penetrated and surreptitious off-loading not possible but more inspectors in transit shuttling between vessels at sea. In port, transit time eliminated but more inspectors required to watch for surreptitious off-loading and to examine in detail cargo coming out of holds. Because port inspection much more comprehensive, every effort should be made to obtain authorization to inspect in port. Estimate ten personnel needed for each



ship entering each port per day. Personnel should be of adequate technical competence to recognize offensive equipment.

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes aboard to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action.

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